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Abstract
This paper is a top down historical perspective on the several
phases in the development of probability from its prehistoric origins
to its modern day evolution, as one of the key methodologies in ar-
tificial intelligence, data science, and machine learning.
It is written in honor of Barry Arnold’s birthday for his many contri-
butions to statistical theory and methodology. Despite the fact that
much of Barry’s work is technical, a descriptive document to mark
his achievements should not be viewed as being out of line. Barry’s
dissertation adviser at Stanford (he received a Ph.D. in Statistics
there) was a philosopher of Science who dug deep in the foundations
and roots of probability, and it is this breadth of perspective is what
Barry has inherent. The paper is based on lecture materials com-
piled by the first author from various published sources, and over
a long period of time. The material below gives a limited list of
references, because the cast of characters is many, and their contri-
butions are a part of the historical heritage of those of us who are
interested in probability, statistics, and the many topics they have
spawned.
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1 Overview
The material here attempts to give a top down historical perspective on the
several phases in the evolution of probability, from its prehistoric origins for
imperial needs, to its current state as a branch of mathematics. As a branch
of the mathematical sciences, probability evolved in five stages, not counting
a period of stagnation between the second and the third stages, when doubts
were cast about its relevance as a mathematical discipline. Also pointed out
are paradoxes in probability, spawned by the absence of its precise definition,
leading to its last two phases, namely, an axiomatic and a subjective view of
probability.
2 The Prehistoric Phase
The rulers of ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome, collected census data for taxes,
grain distribution, and other matters of administration; this activity certainty
had an impact on the origins of probability.
Next to come was the “Doomsday” list of William the Norman (1027 –
1087), which was so exhaustive an economic survey that it reminded one of
the final and the last judgment by God in the Christian faith. Following this
were the “London Bills of Mortality”, published since 1517, and notions such as
the chance of death in a given time period, the chance of survival to a certain
age, and the like, originated, around about 1535, almost a century before John
Graunt’s celebrated mortality table. Another impetus to the origins of probabil-
ity came from marine insurance in the 1300’s, and also during the renaissance,
wherein an emphasis was placed on observation and experiments in the natural
sciences – especially, on errors of observation.
From a philosophical angle, the interrelations between chance and causality
have been on the philosopher’s agenda since the ancient times. These too had
an impact on the origins of probability. In 1292, a treatise on the theory of the
logical ideas of Syadvada (which is the basis of India’s Jaina religion), lists seven
predications of which the fourth supplies a foundation for modern probability.
Another influential angle was the famous dictum of Thomas Hobbs (1588 –
1679), whose thesis was that no matter for how long we observe a phenomenon,
this is not sufficient grounds for its absolute and definitive knowledge.
To summarize, the prehistoric impact on probability came from: census,
commerce, renaissance, scientific observation, and philosophy.
3 Was Probability Not Spawned by Gambling?
Apart from the discussion above, there is another belief that probability theory
owes its birth to gambling. To some, this is a questionable issue. They claim
that since gambling has been practiced since 5000 BC, it could not have taken
6000 years for it to influence probability. Their view is that it was commerce
that really influenced the development of probability.
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Nonetheless, gambling has had an impact on probability, and its earliest
traces are in the literature, such as “De Vetula” of Richard de Fournival (1200
-1250), and Dante’s “Divine Comedy” (1307 – 1321), wherein combinatorial
arguments pertaining to outcomes of games of chance were mentioned.
Paccioli (1445 -1514) published in 1487 “Summa de Arithmetica, Geometria,
Proportioni et Proportionalita”, which was an encyclopedia of the mathematical
knowledge of his period in Venice, and in the section labelled “unusual prob-
lems”, he discussed the question of the fair division of stakes when a match is
stopped in advance of an agreed termination of the game. Paccioli’s solution
embeds notions of probability. This is also called the “problem of points”, and
was a trigger point of the famous Pascal Fermat correspondence.
Cardano (1501 – 1576), and Tartagalia (1499 – 1557) contributed much to the
connection between probability and gambling. Cardano developed probabilistic
notions in “The Book on Games of Chance”, written in 1526, as “Liber de
Ludo Aleae”. In this book, Cardano enumerates possibilities, permutations,
deviations of frequencies from “portion”, introduces the notions of fair games
and expectation, equally likely events, and uses the addition and multiplication
rules of probability for independent events. He even came close to inventing the
law of large numbers. However, Cardano was an ardent gambler who restricted
his writings, only to games of chance. All the same, as one can surmise, he set
the stage for much that was to follow.
Tartagalia (1499-1557) published in Venice in 1556, his treatise on “Number
and Measure” in which he related problems of probability to those of combi-
natorics, and offered correct solutions to the problems posed by Paccioli, in
particular, the problem of the division of stakes, (or the problem of points).
Following Cardano and Tartagalia, was Galileo (1564 – 1642), who posited that
errors of measurement are inevitable; they are symmetric, and clustered around
a true value. He in fact revealed many of the characteristics of the normal
probability distribution.
The above developments, perhaps mark the end of the phase of the earliest
writings on probability, subsequent to its prehistoric phase.
4 Development of Probability as a Science
This phase can be categorized into five stages, and includes a phase called “the
period of stagnation”, between the second and the third stage, when concerns
were raised about probability as a branch of mathematics. Also included is a
phase labeled “paradoxes in probability”, which can be seen as the doorstep
to the development of the last two stages in the evolution of probability as a
mathematical discipline.
Within the five stages alluded to above, are also some milestones in the
evolution of statistics, which evolved as a way to reason with numbers.
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4.1 Stage I. Of the Development of Probability as a Sci-
ence
Up until the middle of the 17th century, there were no general methods for
solving probabilistic problems. Specific problems had been solved, and a sub-
stantial amount of knowledge was accumulated. The term probability (nor its
disposition as a number) was not a part of the lexicon in the solution of such
problems.
In the middle of the 17th century some prominent mathematicians like Pas-
cal, Fermat, and Huygens became involved in the development of probability,
even without mentioning the term. These individuals were familiar with Car-
dano’s addition and the multiplication rules, the notion of independence, and
put to practice the notion of expectation using combinatorics. They developed
new methods for solving problems, determined the realm of problems to which
this new science is applicable, and in so doing were on the verge of transforming
probability to a bona fide science.
Two very important and key individuals need to be mentioned in Stage I.
They were: Chevalier de Me´re, and Christian Huygens. They brought prob-
ability into a new stage as a science. Chevalier de Me´re (1607 – 1684) was
a philosopher and a man of letters; he wrote to Pascal about the division of
stakes [considered by Paccioli but per Shafer (2019) solved in the 1400’s by two
Italian abacus masters, and his (de Me´re’s) solution to it. With Pascal and
Fermat, he had authored in 1662 “Ars Cognitandi” (Art of Thinking) as a part
of the Arnold - Nicole (who were abbots at the Port Royal Monastry), a book
on “Port RoyaleLogic”. de Me´re’s letter to Pascal triggered a correspondence
between Pascal and Fermat in 1654, and thus originated the founding document
on mathematical probability.
Even though many mathematicians of that period devoted much attention
to the solution of games of chance, actual gambling was condemned. Thus, the
myth that Chevalier de Mere was a fervent gambler. Rather, he was a man
of letters who viewed probability only as a “useless curiosity”. By contrast,
Cardano, who was an ardent gambler, used mathematics for gambling, but in
1526 did not quite hit upon the notion of probability as a number.
Christian Huygens (1629 – 1695), a Dutchman from Holland, visited Paris
in 1655 to receive a doctorate in law. He was impressed with the problems on
gambling of Pascal and Fermat, and undertook further work on it. He was told of
the solutions but not the methods (which were published posthumously, because
both Pascal and Fermat posed problems to each other but hid their methods of
solution). The correspondence between Pascal and Fermat was published only
in 1679.
Huygens returned to Holland and begun work on solving the problems posed
by Pascal and Fermat). Huygens solutions, independent of the methods of
Pascal and Fermat, but identical to those of Pascal and Fermat, were published
in his book (written in Latin) called “About Dice Games”. This book appeared
in 1657 wherein Huygens says “... we are dealing not only with games but rather
with a foundation of a new theory, both deep and interesting.” His reasons for
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writing this book was the absence of methods used by Pascal and Fermat.
This book is viewed as the first published treatise on mathematical proba-
bility. Huygens book can be viewed as being the first format document on the
introduction of mathematical probability, until Bernoulli’s famous “Ars Con-
jectandi” (a possible imitation of the Pascal - Fermat- de Mere’s, Ars Cogni-
tandi). Huygen’s book was also the first to introduce and to apply the notion of
expectation in commercial and industrial problems. Huygen’s terminology was
commercial.
Subsequent to the above, more and more works on probability began to
appear,most notable being the birth to a new discipline, now called “Data Sci-
ence”. In 1662, at about the same time as Huygen’s book, John Graunt, an
Englishman, published a tiny book devoted to problems of vital statistics. Huy-
gens was asked to comment on this landmark book, which he did favorably.
Indeed, in 1669, using Graunt’s work Huygens constructed a mortality curve,
and initiated the application of probability to demography, and to annuities. In
1690, another Englishman, by the name of William Petty published his treaties
on “Political Arithmetic”, which was about a method of reasoning on matters
of government, via the use of numbers. This can now be seen as a founding
document on Government Statistics.
Preceding Petty’s treatise, was work on actuarial mathematics and the worth
of annuities, due to deWitts in 1671, followed by that of Edmund Haley in
1693, who published the very first mortality table based on data from Breslau.
Between (1791 - 1799), a Scotsman named John Sinclair published 21 volumes
of his Statistical Account of Scotland, and introduced the word “Statistics” to
replace Petty’s political arithmetic. Up until 1796 the word “statistics” was used
in Germany to describe the political strength, happiness, and the improvement
of a country, as a measure of its well-being. Statistics was an artificial word,
with no evidential meaning, that is now used for anything having to do with
data. Sinclair used it to garner attention over Petty’s political arithmetic, which
did not seemed to have gained traction [cf. von Collani (2014).
To summarize, Huygens recognized the role of probability as a science, wrote
the first book on it, applied the notion of expectation to commerce and industry,
and used probability for assessing demography and insurance. Huygens’ Book
played an important role in the history of probability. Jacob Bernoulli, who in-
troduced the term “probability”, based on the Latin “probabilitas”, was greatly
influenced by Huygen’s book. Bernoulli’s work established the foundations of
mathematical probability.
Bernoulli’s word, probability is based on the term “probabilitas”, which was
a moral system of the Catholic Church. Probabilitas was formally introduced
in 1577 by the Spanish Dominican, Bartholome de Medina, and was mainly
applied by Jesuit priests. Bernoulli’s aim in writing Ars Conjectandi was to
introduce a new branch of science, that he called Stochastics, or the science of
prediction.
To Bernoulli, a relevant feature of “stochastics” was an event’s readiness
to occur, and ”probability”, the degree of certainty of its occurrence, see
von Colani (2014). Thus, to Bernoulli, stochastics was the art of measuring
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probability as exactly as is possible.
However, Bernoulli acknowledged that the determination of the true value of
probability is impossible, and labeled as “mad” any attempt at doing so. This
motivated him to develop his law of large numbers, as an empirical method to
determine a lower and an upper limit for an unknown probability. Note that
Bernoulli’s notion of probability was devoid of any mathematical basis.
Given below is a graphic of the evolution of mathematical probability, up
until the beginning of Stage II which established it as a mathematical science.
Figure 1: Evolution of Mathematical Probability
4.2 Stage II. Bernoulli Makes Probability a Bona Fide
Mathematical Science
James (Jacques) Bernoulli (1654 -1705) in his 1713 “Ars Conjectandi” proved
the first limit theorem, and in so doing, raised the status of probability to that
of a formal mathematical science. This book was published posthumously by
his nephew Nichols (1) Bernoulli [who also applied probability to matters of
jurisprudence, like the credibility of a witness].
The contribution of Bernoulli to make probability a bona fide mathematical
science is that he interpreted propositions in Huygen’s book, showed inapplica-
bility of the addition law to non-disjoint events, gave the binomial formula, and
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used Leibnitz’s combinatorics for solving probability problems.
He proved the weak law of large numbers as a way to bound a “true” prob-
ability, and interpreted probability as the degree of certainty of an event’s oc-
currence. Bernoulli was a metaphysical determinist; i.e. if we know the position
of a dice, its speed, its distance from the board, etc. we can exactly predict
its outcome. Thus, to Bernoulli, probability, or chance, the terms he used in-
terchangeably, depends on our state of knowledge, and is thus personal to the
individual specifying it.
However, since all knowledge is not possible, we assume a statistical regu-
larity in a large number of trials, say n , and conclude that for the tossing of
coins, the deviation of m/n from p, as n→∞ , is small with a large probability;
m is the total number of heads in the n trials. Bernoulli also touched upon
the philosophical problems connected with probability, and asserted probability
should also be applied to situations outside games of chance.
Besides Bernoulli there were others who worked on probability during the
beginning of the 18-th century. We name a few.
Pierre de Montmort (1678 – 1719), a mathematician, who was chosen by
Leibniz on the commission to inquire about the priority of inventing differential
and integral calculus between him and Newton; de Montmort favored Newton;
see Maistrov (1974). His basic work on probability entitled “Essai d’Analyse
sur les Jeux de Hazard” was published in 1708 (5 years prior to Bernoulli’s
posthumously published work). It was in a letter to de Montmort that Nicholas
(1) Bernoulli posed the St. Petersburg paradox. Montmort’s main effort was
the applications of probability to human behavior.
Abraham de Moivre’s (1667 – 1754) principal work in probability was in “The
Doctrine of Chances”, 1718. Here, without addressing the matter of what prob-
ability is, de Moiver discusses topics connected to Bernoulli’s theorem, and the
problem of the duration of the play (first proposed by Huygens). de Moivre in-
vestigated the probabilities of various deviations between m/n and p, for p=1/2.
Laplace extended these to p ∈ (0,1), and thus the de Moivre-Laplace theorem
is the second limit theorem in mathematical probability.
Thomas Bayes (1792 – 1761), speculated as being tutored by de Moivre, pub-
lished his famous essay posthumously in 1763; it was entitled “Thomas Bayes’s
Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances”; it addressed
the following question: what is the chance that p ∈ (a,b) given x and n? Bayes
offered a solution to this problem using solely the calculus of probability. In
so doing, he introduced the notion of what is referred to as “probabilistic
induction”.
To obtain his solution, Bayes used what is now called Bayes formula (which
is really an alternative form of the well-known, by then, multiplication rule),
interpreted conditional probability and its subtleties, and assumed a uniform
distribution on p (via eliciting priors on the observables – i.e. the predictive
distribution). It was Laplace who coined the term “Bayes Theorem” and set in
notion this terminology – Bayes did not invent Bayes Theorem.
Daniel Bernoulli (1700 – 1782) introduced the idea of probability curves,
and applied differential calculus to problems of probability theory, and in so
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doing simplified many of the cumbersome combinatoric formulas used before.
However, his most important contribution is the introduction of the notion of
“utility” or “moral expectation”, and its use in solving the St. Petersburg
paradox, posed by Nicholas (1) Bernoulli.
Condorcet [Jean Antoine de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet] (1743 – 1794)
was a well-known sociologist and economist during the period of the French
Revolution. His main contribution is his introduction of the notion of “proba-
bilite’ propre”, which is a subjective, or personal, probability. His ideas were
rejected as being beyond the scope of mathematical probability theory.
After Bernoulli, one of the great minds that came to wrestle with probability
was Pierre Simon. de Laplace. His main technical contribution is the de Moivre-
Laplace central limit theorem, for Bernoulli trials. His contribution to larger
issues is extending the realm of applicability of probability to social phenomena,
and his reinforcement of Condorcets notion of subjective probability. That is
“probability is relative in part to ignorance, and our knowledge”. If a coin is
asymmetrical, but we do not know which side, then its probability of head is
1/2. Laplace also played a role in developing statistics.
Stage II of the development of probability ends with Gauss (1777 – 1855),
who derived the normal law for the distribution of errors. [This was also done
by Robert Adrian (1755 – 1843) an obscure American mathematician].
Poisson (1781 -1840) did much work on technical and practical aspects
of probability. He subscribed to the subjectivie view of probability, and like
Laplace felt that probability can also be applied to jurisprudence. Poisson’s
main contributions is a generalization of Bernoulli’s theorem when the proba-
bility of an event changes from trial to trial, so that if p˜ is the arithmetic mean
of these probabilities, then
lim
n→∞P (|
m
n
− p˜| < ) = 1,
and his proof that as pn → 0 , then as n → ∞ , P (m/n) = e−nm! e−λ , where
λ = npn , the famous Poisson formula; recall that m is the number of events in
n Bernoulli trials.
4.3 The Period of Stagnation
The period (1860-1900) is also viewed as one of stagnation in the development of
probability. Many felt that its application to social problems was a compromise
in the mathematical sciences.
The areas of application being not clearly defined there was much controversy
about the subject. There was much criticism of the early developers, like Pascal,
Bernoulli, Laplace, and Poisson for their subjectivist inklings via metaphysical
determinism. The period of stnagation terminated with the emergence of the
now famous Russian School of probability.
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4.4 Stage III. Creation of The Russian School
The originators of the Russian School in probability were Ostrogradski (1801-
1862), and Bunyakowski (1804-1889). Ostrogradski, influenced by Laplace, was
a proponent of the principle of insufficient reason, and applied the theory of
probability to moral problems. He too subscribed to the notion that probability
is a measure of our ignorance, and is thus subjective. Bunyakowski wrote the
first Russian book in probability, and introduced the needed terminology; he
too was a determinist in the spirit of Bernoulli and Laplace.
Chebyshev (1821-1894), influenced by Ostrogradski and Bunyakowski, is
credited with the creation of the Russian school of probability. His students
Markov, Voroni, Lyapunov, and Steklov, pushed frontiers of the subject to the
modern era. In effect, Chebyshev and his followers, broke the period of stagna-
tion and impasse in probability, as a mathematical science. Chebyshev defined
the subject matter of probability theory as the mathematical science of con-
structing probabilities of an event based on probabilities of other events. He did
not discuss how initial probabilities are to be obtained. Chebyshev introduced
mathematical rigor in the theorems, and obtained exact estimates or inequali-
ties of derivations from limiting laws which arise when the number of trials is
large but finite.
Philosophically, Chebychev and his followers were materialists through the
natural sciences, mechanics and, mathematics. They were guided by the opinion
that only those investigations initiated by applications are of value, and only
theories which arise from a consideration of particular cases are useful. The
materialist philosophy is founded on the belief that nothing exists but matter
itself and its manifestations.
Markov (1856-1922) was Chebychev’s closest disciples and his most colorful
spokesperson. He transformed probability, with clarity and rigor, to one of
the most perfect field in mathematics. His noteworthy works are on the limit
theorems for sums of independent and dependent random variables using the
method of moments. Markov introduced the famous chain named after him, for
analyzing Pushkin’s poem “Eugene Onegnin”.
Lyapanov (1857-1918) improvised on the proofs of Markov’s theorems using
characteristic functions; the central limit theorem is named after him. Lindberg
and Feller later improved on Lyapunov’s theorems.
4.5 Probability in Physics
The evolution of probability as a mathematical science would not complete
without a mention of its impact in physics, one of the most basic of all the
sciences. In 1827, Robert Brown, an English botanist, detected the movement
of minute suspended particles in an unpredictable manner. This movement is
due to random bombardments of chaotically moving molecules in suspension.
Using probabilistic arguments, Albert Einstein in 1905 was able to develop a
sound theory for such motions. It was observed that every sufficiently small
grain suspended in a fluid constantly moves in an unpredictable manner.
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If before the second half of the 19-th century, the basic areas of application
of probability were in the processing of observations, the second half was in
physics. This was prompted by the work of Ludwig Boltzman (1844-1906), an
Austrian, and Josiah Willard Gibbs (1839-1903), an American.
Boltzman is credited with the initiation of statistical physics, and the prob-
abilistic interpretation of entropy. His work paved the way for quantum theory.
Boltzman was preceded by Maxwell who thought of molecules as elastic solids,
whose behavior can be studied through the methods of probability.
In 1902 Gibbs, who was occupied with problems of mechanics, published his
famous book “Basic Principles of Statistical Mechanics’ ’. This book was an
influential development for the enhancement of probabilistic notions in physics.
4.6 Paradoxes in Probability
Towards the beginning of the 20-th century, great inroads were made in proba-
bility as a mathematical discipline by Chebychev, Markov, and Lyapunov, and
into its inroads in physics by Maxwell, Boltman, and Gibbs. However, mathe-
maticians were repeatedly pointing out concerns regarding the need for a precise
meaning of probability.
Indeed Bertrand (of Bertrand’s Paradox, of which is Borel’s Paradox, and the
three envelope problem are examples), and Henri Poincare, via their paradoxes
tried to emphasize the inaccuracies and vaguenesses in the basic notions of
interpreting probability.
Emil Borel (1871-1956) and Henri Poincare (1854-1912), both prominent
French mathematicians, were determinists whose notion of probability, was that
it is a reflection of our ignorance. Both wrote two highly influential books on
the subject, and called for a rigorous definition of the meaning of probability.
These can be seen as paving the path towards, Stage IV and V, on the axiomatic
and the subjective development of probability.
4.7 Stage IV: The Axiomatic Development
The axiomatic method in science, particularly, the mathematical sciences, makes
it possible to apply any theory to many areas. For example, Lobachevskii (1829)
suggested the possibility of constructing geometry based on a system of axioms,
different from those of Euclid, whereas Hilbert, Peano, and Kagan, investigated
such a possibility for geometry in the early part of the 20-th century; Hilbert
and Peano also did this for arithmetic.
With probability, Laplace’s classical definition using equiprobable events was
a tautology, because: equiprobable ⇔ equal probability. Also, the subjective
interpretation of probability had, at the early part of the 20-th century, serious
flaws having to do with a linear utility for money and state dependence. As a
consequence, the need for axiomatization was becoming more and more pressing.
In 1917, S.N. Bernstein (1880-1968) published a paper hinting the axiomati-
zation of probability. This marked a new stage in its development. Bernstein’s
axiomatization was based on the notion of qualitative comparisons of events in
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which larger and smaller probabilities serve as a foundation. Bernstein’s ideas
were further developed by Glivenko and more recently, by Koopman (1940).
Bernstein’s notion of probability was also materialistic, and was for applica-
tions to the natural sciences.
Richard von Mises (1883-1953) was a strong critic of both the equiprobable
and the subjective theory of interpreting probability. His main contribution is
the frequency approach; i.e. probability is relevant only to mass phenomena.
Approaches alternate to von Mises, were due to Keynes, followed by Harold
Jeffreys, who viewed probability as a degree of likelihood, wherein every propo-
sition has a certain definite probability. It is said that later on, Keynes recanted
this position.
Simultaneous with attempts to lay the foundations of probability were rapid
new developments in the mathematical sciences, vis a vis the works of Khinchin,
Borel, Cantelli, Hardy, Littlewood, and Hausdorff. These trends facilitated Kol-
mogorov to construct his axiomatization of probability and lay the foundation
for a decisive stage in its development. In particular, Bernoulli’s result on the
weak law and Borel’s on the strong law, led Kolmogorov to notice the connection
between probability and measure, and thus began his work on axiomatization,
resulting in the publication of his famous book, in 1933.
Kolmogorov’s aim was not to clarify the meaning of probability, but to estab-
lish a branch of mathematics in exactly the same way as algebra and geometry.
To Kolmogorov, the concept of a theory of probability is a system of sets which
satisfy certain conditions. He thus introduced the term probability in the above
context, detached from any real world meaning.
Not all applied scenarios satisfy Kolmogorov’s set up and architecture. Con-
sequently, there are alternatives to probability like Zadeh’s Possibility Theory
for fuzzy sets, and the Dempster-Shafer Belief Function Theory.
4.8 Stage V: Personal Probability
Approaches at interpreting probability, alternate to the “classical” one of La
Place, the “frequency” one of von Mises, the “logical” one of Keynes, as well
as the axiomatics of Kolmogorov (that technically speaking are free of inter-
pretation) were due to de Finetti, and Ramsey, who interpret probability as
a subjective quantity, personal to each individual. Whereas de Finetti inter-
prets probability as a two-sided bet assuming a linear utility for money, Savage,
motivated by Ramsey takes an axiomatic approach.
Savage’s approach to personal probability was modeled after von-Neumann
and Morgernstern’s axiomatic development of utility theory. This approach,
is the most widely referenced approach to personal probability; it has as its
foundation, behavioristic axioms of choice. Perhaps it is not too well recognized
that these axioms appear to be rooted in Bernstein’s qualitative comparison of
events; save for the feature that they pertain to choices between actions in the
face of uncertainty.
A striking feature of Savage’s axioms is that their consequences lead to the
simultaneous existence of both, a subjective probability and a utility, and the
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maximization of expected utility as a recipe for decision making under uncer-
tainty. Savage’s subjective probability conforms to the Kolmogorov axioms;
however, in the latter’s set up, conditional probability is a definition, whereas
in the former, it is a consequence of the Savage axioms.
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